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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATe OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. McMULLIN, I 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LYNWOOD F. SHIMMIN and ) 
JACQUIE A. SHIMMIN, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
Case No. 
8998 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff's statement of facts in his brief is substantially 
correct. However, exception is taken to the last sentence of 
these facts wherein reference is made to the trial court's ruling. 
The court's ruling was that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
maintain an action for specific performance where he had sold 
and conveyed away the property and was therefore unable to 
specifically perform himself. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE. Plaintiff cannot enforce specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell land where subsequent to the con-
tract's execution he sold and conveyed all the property covered 
by the contract to a third party. 
POINT TWO. Plaintiff is barred after conveying the 
property to a third party from recovering damages as an inci-
dent to the equitable action of specific performance. 
POINT THREE. Plaintiff having retained the earnest 
money is barred from recovery in an action at law for damages. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ENFORCE SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF A CONTRACT TO SELL LAND WHERE 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONTRACT'S EXECUTION HE 
SOLD AND CONVEYED ALL THE PROPERTY COV-
ERED BY THE CONTRACT TO A THIRD PARTY. 
The law is clear and unequivocable that the vendor of land 
cannot maintain an action of specific performance to compel 
the vendee to perform the purchase of said land where the 
vendor has sold or conveyed the property to a third party. 
" * * * it has been repeatedly held that a vendor 
cannot enforce specific performance, where subsequent 
to the execution of the contract he has conveyed a 
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substantial part of the property therein embraced to 
a third person.'' 
Suburban Improv. Co. v. 
Scott Lumber Co., 4th Cir., 1933, 
67 F. 2d 335, 90 A.L.R. 330 
Additional cases citing this proposition of law are found 
in the following annotations: 4 A.L.R. 408, 57 A.L.R. 1253, 
1263, 90 A.L.R. 337. The recent case of First National Bank 
vs. Laperle, 117 Vt. 144, 86 A. 2d 635, 30 A.L.R. 2d 958, 
clearly summarized the law when the court ruled: 
"A decree for specific performance in favor of a 
vendor in a land contract cannot properly be granted 
after full conveyance of the premises in question." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Foxley v. Rich, 
35 U. 162, 99 P. 666, ruled that plaintiff's conduct of selling 
the property prior to the rendition of the decree for specific 
performance would constitute a repudiation of the contract by 
the plaintiff and therefore he would be precluded from main-
taining an action for specific performance. The court said, 
inter alia, at page 670. 
"But the true principle upon which the decisions rest 
is that the effect that such a conveyance will be given 
depends upon the intention of the parties, and upon 
whether the title is in fact placed beyond the control 
of the vendor so his acts amount to a repudiation of his 
contract. If such is the effect, the vendee need not 
perform." 
The facts in the case now before the court show that the 
land in question was sold and conveyed by the plaintiff to 
third parties after the commencement of the action, but months 
before the pre-trial on November 7, 1958. R. 13, R. 22. The 
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record further shows that the consideration paid by the new 
purchasers was in excess of the amount that the defendants 
were to pay for the same property. 
"Specific enforcement will not be decreed if the 
plaintiff has himself committed a material breach un-
less refusal of the decree will effectuate an unjust 
penalty or forfeiture." 
Restatement of Law, Contracts, Sec. 3 75 
The plaintiff, having received a greater amount from the 
new purchasers than he would have from the defendants, can-
not be heard to say that the refusal to grant the decree will 
effectuate an unjust penalty or forfeiture. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED AFTER CONVEYING THE 
PROPERTY TO A THIRD PARTY FROM RECOVERING 
DAMAGES AS AN INCIDENT TO THE EQUITABLE AC-
TION OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Under the common law, specific performance being an 
equitable action precluded the equity court from awarding 
damages as an incident to an action for specific performance. 
However, this situation was changed by the passage in England 
of what is known as the "Lord Cairn's Act." (Chancery Amend-
ment Act, 21 and 22 Veit., Ch. 27, Sec. 1). The application 
of this act has lead to an equity court awarding damages in an 
action for specific performance as an ·adjunct to or in lieu of 
a decree of enforcement, thereby giving complete adjudication 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in one action. The law as practiced today has generally allowed 
the inclusion of a prayer for damages as an alternative to 
specific performance in an action in equity for specific per-
formance. 
However, as stated in 49 Am. Jur. 196, Specific Perform-
ance, Sec. 17 3: 
"The awarding of damages by a court of equity in 
a suit for specific performance in lieu of a decree of 
performance is exceptional, for the very reason that 
jurisdiction of such suit depends on the essential fact 
that a judgment at law for damages would not be an 
adequate remedy, and jurisdiction to award damages 
is exercised only under special circumstances, to prevent 
injustice." 
A plaintiff, in making an election to sue for specific per-
formance instead of an action at law for damages, must of 
necessity proceed through the equitable action with clean hands. 
Pomeroy, in his work, "Specific Performance of Contracts," 
3rd Ed., Sec. 354, p. 762, states: 
" * * * the plaintiff must perform all the terms on 
his part, and that the party coming into a court of 
equity for its relief must himself do equity." 
If the plaintiff has made specific performance impossible 
due to his own actions, the equity court cannot then accord 
that plaintiff equitable relief or any relief which arises out of 
the equitable action. 
"Ordinarily, a bill for specific performance will not 
be retained for the assessment of damage where the 
plaintiff fails to make out a case for specific perform-
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ance and no other special equity is shown which will 
support jurisdiction of the court * * * " 
49 Am. Jur. 196 
Specific Performance, Sec. 173 
The law is clear that where the plaintiff knows at the 
time of bringing the action that specific performance is im-
possible, there can be no award of damages, but the plaintiff 
will be left to his remedy at law. Pomeroy's Specific Perform-
ance of Contracts, 3rd Ed., Sec. 475, pp. 957, 958. 
So, too, where the plaintiff, after the commencement of 
the action, has voluntarily done an act which makes specific 
performance impossible, through no fault of the defendant, 
the plaintiff is precluded from continuing on his action for 
specific performance. He must then either dismiss his action 
and start anew or amend his pleadings in conformity with 
the rules on civil procedure to sue in an action at law for 
damages. 
There is nothing under the rules of civil procedure which 
would preclude the plaintiff from amending his pleadings. 
However, his failure to amend and his affirmative stand on 
his pleadings, then constitutes an election, upon which election 
the plaintiff is then bound by any subsequent rulings of the 
court. 
An examination of plaintiff's pleadings reveals that the 
plaintiff proceeded in this action on one theory and only one 
theory, that of specific performance. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to state inconsistent 
claims or counts in his complaint and the wfiole intent of the 
Rules is to allow free amendment of pleadings. However, 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where plaintiff chooses to stand on his pleadings, then an 
election of remedies occurs and the plaintiff is bound by this 
decision. 
The plaintiff cites the Utah case of Salt Lake City vs. 
Industrial Commission, 81 U. 203, 17 P. 2d 239, in support 
of his contention that he has not made an election of remedies. 
The Supreme Court, in that case, ruled: 
"While there is some conflict in the adjudicated 
cases as to the effect of the mere commencement of an 
action, the authorities are quite general! y agreed that 
it is the first decisive act of election that is binding and 
that subsequent acts may not be said to constitute an 
election." 
In a Utah case which is factually more closely allied to 
the case now before the court than the Salt Lake City case, 
the Supreme Court held: 
"The true rule seems to be ( 1) that there must be, 
in fact, two or more coexisting remedies upon which 
the party has the right to elect; ( 2) the remedies thus 
open to him must be alternative and inconsistent; and 
(3) he must be actually bringing an action or by some 
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, indi-
cate his choice between these inconsistent remedies. 
20 C. J. 19-37 and cases there cited. With such ele-
ments present, an election once deliberately made by 
the institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought 
to be recovered, is final and his failure to secure satis-
faction by means of the remedy which he has adopted 
furnishes no legal reason to permit him to resort to the 
other." (Citing cases) . 
Cook vs. Covey-Ballard Motor Co. 
69 U. 161, 253 P. 196 
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Additional Utah cases on election appear in the annotation 
in 6 A.L.R. 2d 80. 
The record discloses that plaintiff did not in fact attempt 
to amend his pleadings up to and including the date of the 
hearing on his motion to alter judgment. This failure con-
stitutes an election to stand on the equitable action. Plaintiff 
did this because of the ruling of the court in the Andreasen 
vs. Hansen Case, ____ U. ____ , 335 P. 2d 404, which ruling bars 
the plaintiff from maintaining an action for damages because 
of his failure to tender back the earnest money to the defend-
ants. The plaintiff seeks to maintain his equitable action for 
specific performance and obtain damages in lieu of enforce-
ment of the contract, and thereby go around the Andreasen 
case. However, as stated above, the law is that where the 
plaintiff has, through his own conduct, made specific perform-
ance impossible, the action will not be retained by the courts 
for as~essment of damages which the plaintiff may have suf-
fered. 
"Pursuant to the principle that a court of equity 
once having properly acquired jurisdiction in a suit for 
specific performance will make a complete adjudication 
of all matters properly presented and involved in the 
case, the court will in proper cases where, through no 
fault of the plaintiff, specific performance cannot or 
will not be decreed, grant, in lieu thereof, monetary 
damages which the plaintiff may be entitled to recover 
at law in an action for breach of contract." 
49 Am. Jur., 195, Specific Performance, 172 
(Emphasis ours) 
49 Am. Jur. 197, Specific Performance, Sec. 173, states: 
"Even when the plaintiff has made out a proper case 
10 
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for the retention of his bill and the awarding of dam-
ages in lieu of a specific performance, the court will 
not grant that substituted remedy unless it is requested, 
or unless damages are claimed." 
While it is true that plaintiff in his prayer for relief did 
request damages, in the body of the complaint itself there are 
no allegations of any special damages as required by Rule 9 (g) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
"Special Damage. When items of special damages 
are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." 
The only damages alleged by plaintiff in his complaint 
is for a reasonable- attorney's fee. As ruled by this court in the 
ilndreasen case: 
"The award of attorney's fees is conditioned upon the 
necessity for incurring them and upon the plaintiffs 
being justified in their demands." 
In the case now before the court, the plaintiff's conduct 
in selling the property to a third party is evidence of the fact 
that the action for specific performance was not necessary, 
and that the incurring of attorney's fees for the purpose of 
commencing an action of specific performance was completely 
unnecessary. 
Further, the damages asked for in plaintiff's prayer for 
relief, "that plaintiff have judgment against defendants for 
the difference between the contract price and the fair market 
value of the property," limits the amount of damages that 
the plaintiff could recover, as the court cannot go beyond 
plaintiff's demands and award greater damages, especially 
where the plaintiff at no time attempted to amend his plead-
ings to incorporate claims of greater damage. 
11 
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What, then, is the amount of the damage that the court 
could award? The contract price of the propery was $17,500.00. 
The property was sold by plaintiff for $17,950.00. This court, 
in the recent decision of V rontikis Bros. et al vs. State Tax 
Commission, ruled: 
"The accepted formula for determining fair market 
value is * * * what would a purchaser willing to buy 
but not required to do so, pay and what would a seller 
willing to sell but not required to do so ask.'' 
Certainly, the plaintiff cannot say that he was under any 
compulsion to sell this property, and, as a third party bought 
the property, as a matter of law it may be said that the fair 
market value of the proprety in question was $17,950.00. 
What, then, has the plaintiff suffered? There was no need 
to retain the services of an attorney for an action of specific 
performance, when the plaintiff's conduct points out that he 
never did have the intention of enforcing specific performance 
,against the defendants, and, as to damages, the plaintiff 
received $450.00 more for his property than he would have 
received had he sold it to the defendants. 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF HAVING RETAINED THE EARNEST 
MONEY IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY IN AN ACTION 
AT LAW FOR DAMAGES. 
The case now before the court stems from a factual situa-
tion similar to the Andreasen vs. Hansen case. The same earnest 
money receipt and offer to purchase used in the Andreasen 
12 
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case was used in this matter and the same representations that 
if the purchasers did not want the house the money paid would 
be forfeited and the matter closed. Like in the Andreasen 
case, the plaintiff in this matter chose to retain the earnest 
money ($100.00), and has never tendered its return to the 
defendants. This retention constitutes the exercising of the 
option by the vendor (plaintiff) to retain the earnest money 
as the agreed and liquidated damages. 
Plaintiff in his brief alleges that the trial court based 
its decision on the Andreasen case. This is not borne out by 
statement of the trial court made during the argument on the 
motion to alter judgment. 
"Well, the motion to alter the judgment will be 
denied, and the ruling of the court on November 7 
will be affirmed because it appears that the plaintiff has 
put it beyond himself to specifically perform at this 
time." R. 23 
The issue in this case is not whether or not plaintiff should 
have tendered back the earnest money, because plaintiff has 
not amended his pleadings to come in damages. The issue of 
this case is whether or not plaintiff by having sold and con-
veyed the property is barred from maintaining his equitable 
action on specific performance. Of course the Andreasen case 
is in issue as far as its effect on the matter if the plaintiff had 
amended his pleadings so as to come in damages, or if plaintiff's 
actions can be construed to be an amendment of his pleadings. 
If there has been an amendment effectuated, the pleadings and 
record do not so indicate. 
13 
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SUMMARY 
The plaintiff, by selling and conveying the property he 
was seeking to compel the defendants to purchase by specific 
performance of a contract, has precluded the court from de-
creeing specific performance or awarding damages in lieu 
of the specific performance. The plaintiff is barred by having 
retained the earnest money paid to him by the defendants from 
maintaining an action at law for damages. The pleadings and 
the record show that the plaintiff in any event has not been 
injured in any way by the defendants, but in fact has profited 
some $450.00 by the defendants' refusal to purchase the prop-
erty. Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief and the trial court 
was correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint for specific 
performance with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Respondents 
and Defendants 
14 
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